American University Criminal Law Brief
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 5

2009

Birthing Out Delinquents: Alternative Treatment Options For
Juvenile Delinquents
Jerome R. Price

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Price, Jerome R. "Birthing Out Delinquents: Alternative Treatment Options For Juvenile Delinquents."
American University Criminal Law Brief 4, no. 1 (2009): 51-58.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American University Criminal Law Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

Birthing Out Delinquents:
Alternative Treatment Options For Juvenile Delinquents
By: Jerome R. Price

The juvenile court docket is overloaded with interesting,
but unfortunate, life chronicles of juveniles who have engaged in
delinquent behavior resulting in institutionalized punishment.
Seventeen year old Tee1 is one of the individuals that fall into this
category. On January 7, 1988, Tee was born into a dysfunctional
family. He was greeted at the hospital by his mother who had a drug
and alcohol problem, two additional children from two different
men, and a father who wanted to give his son the best possible life.
Unfortunately, Tee’s father only played a limited part in his upbringing. Throughout his elementary and middle school years, Tee was
an average student who allowed others to pressure him into doing
things contrary to what children his age should have been doing,
such as using vulgarity, skipping school, smoking, drinking, etc.
At the age of fourteen, Tee’s behavior began to spiral out of control
when he was arrested for habitual truancy during high school. Tee
saw his arrest as a joke and, as a result, he continued to live a delinquent lifestyle, dropping out of high school at the age of fifteen. To
help combat Tee’s behavior, the juvenile court sent him to a boot
camp in another city away from his family and troubled friends for
approximately two years.
Upon completion of boot camp, Tee returned home to live
with his mother. The change in his behavior looked promising, but
was short lived. By the age of sixteen, Tee had been arrested for
possession of both crack cocaine and marijuana, driving without a
license, and driving stolen vehicles. Now, the question is: what
should the juvenile justice system do with Tee? Should there be a
continued attempt to rehabilitate him in the juvenile system or
should he be transferred to the adult criminal system? This question
about Tee’s disposition and others like him has caused an uproar in
various communities, prompting community members to wonder if
the juvenile justice system is too lenient and should be reformed to
handle serious repeat offenders.
Tee’s life resembles that of many juveniles housed and
penalized by the juvenile justice system. To resolve the issue of how
to treat serious repeat offenders, many legislatures believe these
juveniles should lose their juvenile status and be waived into the
adult criminal system.2 Waiving juveniles into the adult system
means they stand trial as criminal defendants and receive sentences
comparable to those of adults tried for the same crime,3 but this
does “little to rehabilitate juvenile offenders.”4
This article challenges the notion that children cannot be
rehabilitated. It focuses on the fact that there are numerous programs and alternatives available for states to implement. In addition to identifying various alternatives, this article infers key factors
to rectifying this problem: accepting the fact that there is a problem,
getting to the root of the problem, finding a reasonable and efficient
mechanism to deal with the problem, and attacking the problem
from the outset. By accepting these fundamental elements as a
guide, legislatures, community activists and political leaders are
able to realize the dangers of transferring juveniles into the adult
system. Being aware of these elements can prevent the decisionmakers from suddenly changing the face of the juvenile justice system forever. The reformers took a stance for rehabilitation over punishment, but now the juvenile system is well on its way to becoming a punitive system aimed at punishing juveniles more harshly
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than the progressive reformers intended.5
Part I of this article gives a historical framework as to how
the juvenile justice system emerged, and how it has changed over
the years. Part II examines various alternatives that states can
employ to curtail juvenile delinquency from the outset. Part III uses
The Warrior Lawyer: Powerful Strategies for Winning Legal Battles
as a guide to analyzing the issue of juvenile delinquency in conjunction with the available alternatives.
The Evolution of the Juvenile Justice System:An English
Backdrop for the Establishment of the Juvenile Justice System
From the outset, “society has treated children differently
than adults.”6 Prior to the nineteenth century, children under the
age of seven in England were not considered responsible for their
criminal acts. However, at the age of seven children were not only
considered responsible for their criminal actions, but were tried as
adults “suffering the same consequences for their behavior.”7 This
ideology was harsh for any child to endure; however, depending
upon the crime committed, the child could escape the adult penalty
if the particular crime were so reprehensible that the child could not
appreciate the ramifications of his or her actions, as with murder.8
This limitation recognized that young children have not developed
enough cognitively to understand that not everything they see,
whether within or outside of their community, is legal. However,
the English emphasized that at a certain age a child is responsible
for his or her actions, including showing disobedience or disrespect
to one’s parents.9
By the early 1800s, Sir John Eardley-Wilmot, an
Englishman, concluded that it was time to change the way children
under English law were punished.10 His proposal separated the children and the adults into two distinct tribunals.11 The purpose was to
avoid attaching the “stigma and contamination” of prison to children prosecuted under the current criminal justice system, “the publicity of trial, and all the evils which infallibly result from early
imprisonment.”12 Like many supporters of the original juvenile justice system, Sir Eardley-Wilmont believed “that if children were
placed in prisons with hardened adult criminals, they would have
little chance to become productive law abiding citizens.”13
Reform Schools and “Houses of Refuge”

To remove and rehabilitate juveniles involved in a delinquent lifestyle from the community before they committed any serious or violent offenses, institutions called “Houses of Refuge” were
erected.14 These houses were created for juveniles who lived in an
environment that produced bad habits. These habits were considered a setback for juveniles trying to escape the pressures of committing serious offenses.15 The first House of Refuge was built in
1825 in New York City, followed by two additional facilities in
Boston in 1826 and Philadelphia in 1829.16
In 1892, Elbridge T. Gerry, president of the New York
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children asserted that
“poverty, inadequate housing and neglectful parents” were the causes of juvenile delinquency.17 The idea that poverty, inadequate
housing and neglectful parents caused juvenile delinquency gave
reformers the necessary ammunition to create “alternatives to incar-
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cerating children” with adult criminals, like Houses of Refuge.18
While some reformers supported the creation of Houses of Refuge,
others believed that it was simply a political move “to repress the
impoverished in general and immigrants in particular.”19 Though
the reasons for creating Houses of Refuge may be debatable, the
main objective of removing juveniles from the streets before they
engaged in serious crime was accomplished; thus, the reformers
achieved their desired outcome.
Following the success of the Houses of Refuge, the
reformers believed that it was time to not only rehabilitate the juveniles, but to educate them and teach them life skills that would put
them in a position to compete for the occupational and trade positions available in their community.20 This innovative idea was the
launching ground for state reform schools in Massachusetts in 1847,
New York in 1849, and Maine in 1853.21 These schools were founded on strong principles:
(1) Young offenders must be segregated from the corrupting influences of adult criminals, (2) Delinquents
`
need to be removed from their environment and imprisoned for their own good and protection; reformatories
should be guarded sanctuaries, (3) Delinquents should be
assigned to reformatories without trial and with minimal
legal requirements . . . (4) Sentences should be indeterminate, so that inmates are encouraged to cooperate in their
own reform and recalcitrant delinquents are not allowed
to resume their criminal careers, and (5) Reformation
should not be confused with sentimentality.”22
Reform schools remained in existence until the inception of the first
juvenile justice system.
America’s First Juvenile Justice System
By the close the nineteenth century, America was well on
its way to transforming the way juveniles were tried in its court system. In 1899, the state of Illinois changed the face of juvenile law
by instituting the first juvenile justice system in America.23
The nation increasingly accepted the idea of having a separate institute to adjudicate juveniles, and “by 1925, all but two states had
established juvenile courts.”24 The concept behind the initial juvenile justice system was to focus on the juvenile instead of the
offense.25 By making the juvenile delinquent the focal point, the
progressive reformers addressed the childrens’ needs individually
as opposed to collectively, thereby allowing the state to “act in the
best interest of the child.”26 The progressive reformers believed that
children should be treated differently than adults due to their physical, mental and emotional immaturity, which placed them in a position requiring parental nurturing.27
Parental nurturing in the juvenile justice system took root
in a doctrine called parens patriae, which meant “the responsibility
of the state to care for persons who are unable to care for themselves
or whose families are unable to care for them.”28 Under the doctrine
of parens patriae, the progressive reformers followed the conclusions of Elbridge Gerry29 that delinquency resulted from social circumstances such as poverty, parental neglect and urban plight.30
The court assumed jurisdiction over them in three different situations:
first, where there has been child abuse and neglect which
endangers the child (the “Abuse Jurisdiction”); second,
when a child has violated a criminal law (the
“Delinquency Jurisdiction”); and third, when a child
commits some type of behavior that is “inappropriate,”
although would not be considered criminal if committed
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by an adult, such as school truancy (the “Children in
Need of Supervision” (CHINS) Jurisdiction).31
Changes in the Juvenile Justice System
By the 1930s, the juvenile justice system’s old philosophy
of treating children like adult criminals had been abolished, and its
new philosophy of rehabilitation was now the governing principle
of the juvenile justice systems in the United States.32
At first, this was achieved primarily by the states, with the federal
government having only a minuscule function in developing policy.33 However, in 1938, the federal government made its imprint
on the juvenile justice system by enacting the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act, which granted the government jurisdiction to
prosecute juveniles in federal court.34 Congress granted federal
jurisdiction over juveniles who committed certain crimes, thereby
giving “the Attorney General unlimited discretion in deciding
whether to offer prosecution as a juvenile to any defendant under
the age of eighteen not surrendered to state officials or charged with
offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death.”35
Changes in the 1960s
Up until the 1960s, the juvenile justice system had managed to escape criticism from the government and the public, but
that era came to a close at the beginning of the 1960s.36 Criticism
during this decade “focused largely on the procedural infirmities of
the juvenile justice court.”37 In 1965, the President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice was established to analyze the structure and implementation of procedures in
the juvenile justice system.38 This Commission felt that arresting
children and referring them to treatment programs was not helping
to rehabilitate delinquents, and that the focus should be on preventing juvenile delinquency.39 The President’s Commission believed
that a new approach to rehabilitate juveniles was in order.40 To
assist the juvenile justice system in promoting its philosophy of
rehabilitation, the commission offered seven recommendations:
(1) The formal system should be used only as a last
resort, (2) Efforts to narrow the juvenile court’s jurisdiction should be continued, (3) Procedural justice for the
child should be instituted, (4) …expanded use of nonjudicial community agencies, (5) For children for whom
detention is made necessary only by the unavailability of
adequate parental supervision, there should be low security community residential centers and similar shelters, (6)
Legislation should be enacted restricting both authority to
detain and the circumstances under which detention is
permitted, and (7) Correctional authorities should develop
more extensive community programs providing special,
intensive treatment as an alternative to institutionalization
for both juvenile and adult offenders.41
After making its recommendations, the President’s Commission
contacted the National Council on Crime and Delinquency to run a
study on various state and local juvenile correctional facilities to
determine who was being placed in those institutions.42 The survey
unveiled a startling demographic: the juveniles incarcerated in these
facilities were nonviolent delinquents “accused of non-criminal
conduct.”43 This discovery prompted a recommendation from the
National Council: “[N]o child should be placed in any detention
facility unless he is a delinquent or alleged delinquent and that there
is a substantial probability that he will commit an offense dangerous to himself or to the community or will run away pending court
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disposition.”44
Following the recommendations from the President’s
Commission and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
the juvenile justice system underwent strict scrutiny regarding juvenile punishment. By the mid-1960s the Supreme Court had made
decisions that would alter the way children in the United States
could be tried in the court system. In Kent v. United States, a sixteen year old boy charged with “housebreaking, robbery, and rape”
was waived to the adult court by a juvenile court judge without justification.45 This transfer was deemed invalid by the Supreme
Court.46 Justice Fortas, writing the opinion of the Court, held “that
the waiver hearing is an extremely important proceeding and,
accordingly, the juvenile must be given an opportunity for hearing
and reasons for granting a waiver order.47
After extending the due process clause of the constitution
to juveniles in Kent, the Supreme Court extended it even further in
another landmark case one year later, In re Gault.48 A fifteenyear-old boy was arrested for making lewd remarks to a neighbor
while on probation, and sentenced to a state industrial school until
the age of twenty-one.49 The court’s holding in this case “granted
additional due process rights to juveniles facing incarceration,
including notice of the charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination, and the privilege against selfincrimination.”50
Changes in the 1970s
After the Supreme Court established constitutional due
process rights for juveniles, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.51 The purpose of the Act
was to amend the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act by:
(1) Changing the definition of juvenile, (2) Requiring
judicial approval before prosecuting a juvenile as an
adult, (3) Restricting the number of offenses for which a
juvenile could be tried as an adult, and (4) Providing for
federal prosecution of juveniles when no state would
exercise jurisdiction over the offender.52
These amendments gave federal prosecutors three situations in
which they could invoke jurisdiction over a juvenile under the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act: “(1) [I]f a state lacks, or refuses to assert jurisdiction over a particular juvenile offender, (2) if the
state’s programs do not adequately meet the needs of the juvenile,
or (3) If there is a substantial federal interest in prosecuting the particular defendant.”53 Once jurisdiction is established by the prosecutor, a juvenile may stand trial as an adult three different ways.
First, the juvenile may consent to stand trial as an adult; second, if
the child is over a certain age, charged with a felony or drug offense,
the Attorney General may request jurisdiction; and lastly, if a juvenile offender is at least sixteen, charged with a serious offense, the
prosecutor may invoke a “mandatory transfer provision,” establishing jurisdiction.54
Waivers
By the close of the 1970s, the juvenile justice system transformed from a rehabilitating system into one that punished juveniles to the full extent of the law, stripping the court of its juvenile
safeguards and allowing for transfers to the adult court.55
The ability to transfer juveniles into the adult court was achieved
by decreasing the minimum age required to give the adult criminal
system jurisdiction over the juvenile.56 The adult court can invoke
jurisdiction over a juvenile by either a judicial waiver, legislative
waiver, or prosecutorial waiver.57
A judicial waiver is a method of transfer that gives a juve-
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nile court judge the authority to transfer a juvenile delinquent to the
adult court for adjudication; however, the judge’s discretion is guided by statutes which “limit the judge’s decision to juveniles of a
minimum age who have been charged with specific offenses.”58
Legislative waivers, on the other hand, are state statutes that automatically remove certain offenses from the juvenile court to the
adult court without interference from the judge or the prosecutor.59
By contrast, prosecutorial waivers give the prosecutor the discretion
to proceed with formal criminal charges in the adult system.60
The problem with waivers in today’s society, where the
media reports a surge of juveniles committing serious crimes,61 is
that it places a burden upon court officials to determine which juveniles are really dangerous and capable of committing serious acts of
violence. Placing this type of discretion in the hands of officials
could cause additional problems within the system, such as discriminatory dispositions. The current literature seems to find “little evidence that use of waivers deter juvenile crime.”62 This indicates that
waivers fail to address the root of the problem, and therefore are
incapable of effectively addressing juvenile delinquency.
Alternative Programs for Juvenile Delinquents Integrated
Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender (SHJO) Programs

Finding effective programs to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents has not been an easy task for state legislatures, political leaders, judges, or even parents. As a result, many states have developed
juvenile justice systems aimed at balancing the traditional philosophy of rehabilitation with the current philosophy of punishment.63
The argument for rehabilitation is that children who commit criminal acts have the propensity to be rehabilitated through appropriate
interventions targeted at meeting their needs, as opposed to threats
of punishment by the state’s penal system.64 Proponents of a punitive system, on the other hand, argue that children must be deterred
from committing future criminal acts and that by punishing them
through incapacitation they become individuals who will take
responsibility for their actions. In an effort to blend the rehabilitation and punishment aspects of the juvenile justice system, states
have developed what are called Integrated Serious and Habitual
Juvenile Offender programs (SHJO).65
SHJO programs were designed to treat chronic offenders;
treatment for these juveniles meant a punishment severe enough to
compensate for the wrong done, but not so harsh that it would stifle
the potential for rehabilitation.66 These programs share five key
characteristics: “(1) An initial period of incarceration or detention,
(2) The use of small facilities, (3) An emphasis on accountability,
(4) Intensive supervision throughout the program, and (5) A substantial offering of rehabilitation services.”67 When all five components are connected, society’s probability of having a rehabilitated
individual re-enter the community increases drastically because
each of the five components serves a distinct purpose in the
process.68 The initial period of incarceration is used to satisfy the
goals of punishment and deterrence and to emphasize that the juvenile is accountable for his actions.69 The use of small spaces may
help to create an atmosphere that is open and friendly for the juvenile, giving him or her an opportunity to have time alone or in a
small group to think and/or talk about the act committed. Lastly, the
intensive supervision element works in conjunction with the
accountability component of the program because it serves as a continued punishment for the juvenile, and ensures “a continued contact with the offender so that rehabilitative services may be delivered effectively.”70
Therefore, the opportunities available to juveniles through
SHJO programs far outweigh the get tough mantra that is so popu-
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lar in today’s society.71 These programs offer delinquent children
“counseling, job training, job placement, drug abuse rehabilitation,
education, and other services,” none of which the adult criminal
system offers to juveniles waived into its court.72 If we want to
change the recidivism rates of juveniles, it will take programs like
this, which couple intellectual empowerment and punishment.
Pretrial Diversionary Programs
Pretrial diversionary programs subscribe to the same concept employed by SHJO programs in that they focus on blending
rehabilitation with punishment.73 This blend of rehabilitation and
punishment imposes responsibility upon the juvenile for his or her
own actions, while addressing “the state and federal legislative
requirements of restitution, community service, and parental
responsibility with counseling and continued education.”74 These
programs offer juveniles charged with criminal offenses the option
of having their cases “referred to community agencies while their
criminal complaints are held in abeyance.”75 The benefits to states
who implement this program are twofold: the program is cheaper
than traditional incarceration and it addresses the main objective of
the juvenile justice system, which is to “remove as many juveniles
as possible from the ‘revolving door’ syndrome, thus reducing
recidivism.”76
Before a juvenile can participate in this program, a probation officer makes an initial decision as to whether any action
should be taken against the juvenile and, if so, whether that action
should be formal or informal.77 Formal proceedings place the delinquent under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, where he or she
could be incarcerated, placed on probation, or assigned to participate in a court-ordered program.78 Informal proceedings, such as
pretrial diversionary programs, are special programs instituted by
the court and, if completed successfully, can erase the juvenile’s
criminal record.79 There are two types of diversionary programs
offered: Statutory Pretrial Programs80 and Community Volunteer
Pretrial Programs.81
Statutory Pretrial Diversionary Programs are considered
informal probation, which place juveniles under the supervision of
a probation officer.82 This program requires the juvenile and his parents to sign a contract, with terms not to exceed six months, describing the behavior the juvenile will be expected to adhere to while on
probation; this list includes but is not limited to restitution, gang
association, continued education, and curfews.83 At the completion
of the contract, the juvenile cannot be tried again for that particular
criminal act, but his or her record will show the arrest and informal
probation. The benefit is that it will not affect the delinquent’s
chances of being admitted into college or serving in the military.84
On the other hand, should the delinquent fail to complete the program successfully, he or she will face the probability of formal court
proceedings .85
By contrast, the Community Volunteer Pretrial Program
places the juvenile back within the community in which he or she
committed the offense as a form of accountability and rehabilitation.86 The underlying theme of this program is to “hold the juvenile
responsible and accountable for his actions, involve the juvenile’s
parent(s) in the program, stress community involvement, provide
supervision and counseling if needed, and stress the importance of
education.”87 The benefit to participating in this particular program
over the other pretrial program is quite simple: if successfully completed there is no indication on the juvenile’s record that he or she
has been under any type of informal or formal court sanctions.88
However, like the Statutory Pretrial Program, if the juvenile fails to
successfully complete the program, he or she faces the probability
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of enduring a formal court proceeding.89
Pretrial diversionary programs offer the state another
option to address the issue of juvenile delinquency. Both pretrial
programs avoid the mistake of labeling a child a juvenile delinquent
at a young age, a label which can subject the child to a self-fulfilling prophecy.90 These programs are not the final answer to this
problem, but they do help to reduce the recidivism rates of juveniles
by blending rehabilitation with punishment.91
Boot Camps
Juvenile boot camps originated in 1985 in New Orleans,
Louisiana.92 The concept for developing juvenile boot camps
stemmed from the objectives of adult boot camps: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and cost-control.93 To achieve those goals,
the juvenile boot camps had to adopt the elements of traditional
boot camps, such as: “a military-style environment, separation of
boot camp participants from regular prison inmates when they are
housed at collocated facilities, the participant’s perception that boot
camp is an alternative to a longer term of confinement,” and “some
hard labor.”94 These goals appeared to have the potential to change
the lives of troubled youth. After analyzing the elements associated
with boot camps, the Office of Juvenile Programs developed the criteria for the program dealing specifically with the philosophy of
rehabilitation: enhancing the juvenile’s perspective on life through
education and life skill initiatives.95
Boot camps were founded to help individuals by placing
them under military type conditions,96 but the effectiveness of these
boot camps in improving the lives of juveniles and reducing recidivism rates is not supported by empirical evidence.97 Their success
can only be measured by analyzing the behavior of the juveniles
released from these facilities, and not by assumptions made by supporters of juvenile boot camps.
Family-Based Initiatives
The family is the foundation on which a child builds
morals and a system of values. It is also the unit that orchestrates
social harmony, discipline, self-esteem, and a host of other valuable
assets that one needs to become prominent and socially acceptable
members of society, but without the family, one is easily led astray.
To assist in helping families cope with juvenile delinquency, two
types of programs have been developed: “those that focus on training parents in family management techniques and those that provide
an array of supportive services such as child care and/or medical
and social services to socially disadvantaged families.”98
Parental training programs emerged in the 1960s as a result
of child therapists recognizing that disciplining children and managing their behavior began at home.99 Not correcting delinquent
behavior can give a child the indication that his or her behavior is
appropriate. Although parental training programs may seem like the
answer to solving the problem of juvenile delinquency, there is
“scant evidence concerning its effectiveness as a primary prevention strategy.”100 On the other hand, research does support the
notion that “siblings of behavior-disordered youths were less likely
to exhibit problem behaviors and delinquency following intervention than siblings of comparison youth.”101
In addition to teaching parents how to deal with behaviorally challenged children at home, family support programs have
also been implemented to assist families with obtaining the necessities needed to run the family, such as day care, counseling and
medical necessities.102 Offering these services to families who
could not otherwise afford them gives those familial units the
strength and courage to excel beyond their current position.103
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Research shows that by supporting at risk families, children born
under weight are able to overcome the “cognitive and parenting
problems” associated with low birth weight.104
Developing programs to build the family is a start to
changing the direction of juvenile delinquency. If the home is the
place where behaviors are formed and nurtured then the family
must do more to curtail delinquent behavior.105 The family is an
integral part of a person’s life and it should be given the credit it
deserves.
School-Based Initiatives
Schools are considered an important socializing experience in a child’s early childhood and adolescent years.106 Although
steps have been taken to make schools a safe haven for children,
there is only so much that principals, teachers, and teaching assistants can do. Research confirms this by indicating that “children
with a low IQ, disability, poor attitudes toward school and school
failure are all related to and often precede official and self-reports
of delinquent behavior; however, this behavior can be minimized if
not eliminated if the child’s environment and mind can be manipulated to focus on academics.”107
To help children focus on academics as opposed to delinquency at an early age, preschool programs such as Project Head
Start have been developed to give children a solid foundation for
preventative intervention.108 Head Start programs were created as
part of former United States President Lyndon Johnson’s war on
poverty.109 The objective of this program was to reach the impoverished neighborhoods of the United States in hopes of educating high
risk children while providing them with invaluable services.110
Research in this area suggests that Head Start has made significant
changes in the lives of high risk children; participants have shown
a “short-term improvement” in IQ levels “and academic performance and long-term improvements in school functioning.”111
Educating juveniles is imperative if our goal in society is
to stop the cycle of delinquency. Education gives an individual the
ability to make rational choices, critically analyze situations, and
decipher between right and wrong.112 Children who participated in
Head Start had a higher graduation rate and lower grade retention
rate, indicating that if children can be reached early, the doorway to
success remains open.113
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Mentoring
Program
Mentoring children from a disadvantaged background is
critical. It affords children an opportunity to see that there are people in their community who want to show them love and affection;
it is this type of caring that has the potential to change a juvenile’s
life forever.114 The office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention defines mentoring as a “one-on-one relationship
between a pair of unrelated individuals, one adult and one juvenile,
which takes place on a regular basis over an extended period of
time.”115 This office created the Juvenile Mentoring Program
(JUMP) to promote education and discourage juvenile delinquency
following amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act
of 1974.116 All participants in the JUMP are volunteers from the
community, with occupations ranging from police officers to college students.117The mentees come from various ethnic backgrounds, range in age from five to twenty, and can be found either
in a detention center, school, or at home because they have dropped
out of school.118
JUMP and other mentoring programs, such as Big
Brother/Big Sister, have experienced great success with juvenile
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delinquents.119 Research indicates that delinquents mentored on a
one-on-one basis were “less likely to initiate drug and alcohol use,
resort to violence”, more competent about their schoolwork,
skipped fewer classes, increased their grades, and improved relationships with their peers.120 The Office of Juvenile Justice attributes this success to two elements: the screening and training of its
volunteers and supervision of each pair of individuals by a case
manager.121 One can conclude that if states really wanted to curtail
juvenile delinquency within their jurisdictions, it is going to take
programs, such as JUMP and Big Brother/Big Sister, that attack the
problem at root while finding permanent solutions to address it.
Teen Court
Teen court is a community based initiative aimed at using
peer influence to deter juvenile delinquency.122 It is rooted in the
philosophy that teenagers are less likely to commit delinquent acts
when they know their peers will judge their behavior and impose
consequences.123 The distinguishing characteristic is that teen court
is run exclusively by teens, with the exception of the judge and
bailiff.124 To appear before this court a juvenile must admit that he
or she has committed the alleged crime, which gives the “police
department, sheriff’s office, school district, or juvenile court” the
authority to refer the delinquent to the informal proceedings.125 To
be eligible the juvenile is typically between the ages of ten and
eighteen.126
Peer influence in the juvenile justice system has proven to
be a successful initiative throughout the United States,127 lowering
recidivism rates to as low as five percent in some cities.128
The benefits to having a teen court in each state are numerous,
including but not limited to “encourag[ing] a sense of responsibility and awareness of the consequences of criminal behavior,
…impart[ing] a positive attitude and respect for the law and authority, and …educat[ing] as well as providing an opportunity for juvenile offenders to develop and sharpen interpersonal and communication skills required of productive members of society.”129 Teen
courts are another alternative for states seeking to reduce juvenile
delinquency.
The Warrior Lawyer: Power Strategies for Winning Legal
Battles

Timing as the Basis of Strategy
In response to “[p]ublic fear, political capitalism, and a
handful of well-publicized incidents involving violence by juvenile
actors,” many jurisdictions across the United States have implemented various programs aimed at dealing with juvenile delinquency.130 Many of these programs fail because they do not timely
address what initially causes juvenile delinquents to engage in criminal acts. In Book of Five Rings, Musashi supports the concept
addressing the root of a problem in the following statement:
From the outset you must know the applicable timing and
the inapplicable timing, and from the large and small timings and the fast and slow timings find the relevant timing, first seeing the distance timing and the background
timing. This is the main thing in strategy. It is especially
important to know the background timing, otherwise your
strategy will be uncertain.131
This thesis symbolizes exactly what jurisdictions across the United
States should consider when developing programs that were supposedly able to reduce juvenile activity. A strategists should first
look at the problem he or she is trying to address from a broad perspective to gain insight into the actual issue. It is not easy to develop and implement a program for a specific problem if you do not
know the necessary components needed to make the program suc-
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cessful. Therefore, when this statement is applied to Parts I and II
of this article, it is clear where the problem lies. For example, Part
II discusses juvenile boot camps, how they developed and what they
were patterned after.132 Analyzing boot camps in conjunction with
an understanding of Musashi’s statement may help one make the
following conclusions as to what would have made an effective
boot camp.
A Strategic Plan for the Formation of an Effective Boot Camp
Boot camps throughout the United States could have been
a great success had they been developed and implemented differently. Coupling military structure and order with individualized treatment would have been a great alternative to dealing with juvenile
delinquency. This combination teaches discipline while treating the
problem, unfortunately the boot camps that were instituted missed
the element of individualized treatment. A strategic look at what
was causing juvenile delinquency is the first thing that should have
been done in developing an effective boot camp. The origin of the
delinquent’s behavior could have come from array of factors, e.g. a
dysfunctional family, peer pressure, physical, mental, or sexual
abuse, or lack of attention. Discovery of the causal links would
have given the program advisors or developers the “background
timing” to effectively develop a strategy to deal with these factors.133 After identifying the causal links to delinquency, the next
step would have been to determine what types of treatment were
needed to address the problem and make the children whole, which
would have given the program advisors the “applicable timing.”134
This particular aspect of the process is important because some children may need special attention or counseling to sort through their
issues, rather than military style discipline. Finally, the program
advisors should have found the “relevant timing” by looking at the
needed treatments and determined when each one should have been
implemented to achieve the best possible outcome.135 Had the creators of boot camps followed a strategic plan such as this, participants would have been afforded a tailor-made institutionalized court
sanction, which may have had lower recidivism rates.136 For
Musahsi, “timing is the basis of all strategy.”137
Experience as the Basis of Strategy
Growing up in America is like living in a classroom;
everyday of life brings a new subject area to learn. Some people’s
lives are a twenty-four hour lesson because of the choices they
make, i.e. getting involved in criminal activity at an early age.
Deterring juveniles involved in this lifestyle at an early age has not
been an easy task, but as a strategic move the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention decided to develop a mentoring
program, JUMP, to guide troubled youth down the right path.138
This program was built upon the philosophy of promoting education and discouraging juvenile delinquency through mentoring.139
JUMP shows mentees that they are not the only individuals who
may come from an impoverished neighborhood, or had neglectful
or absent parents, or who have experienced some type of traumatic
event in their lives, but that the key to surviving these setbacks is to
overcome those obstacles through perseverance. Thus, the juveniles
will not feel as if they are being frowned upon because of what they
have faced in their lives, but rather that they can achieve what once
seemed unattainable.140
The Success of JUMP
The JUMP initiative was a successful strategic move due
to the individualized attention the mentees receive.141 Mentoring
troubled youth involves more than just spending a couple days out
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of the week talking and playing games; real mentoring requires
teaching the mentee how to behave like adults.142 JUMP mentors
accomplished this, by following a concept similar to that of
Musashi:
When I teach my way, I first teach by training in techniques which are easy for the pupil to understand, a doctrine which is easy to understand. I gradually endeavor
to explain the deep principle, points which it is hardly
possible to comprehend, according to the pupil’s
progress. The way to understanding is through experience.143
In the context of mentoring, to make an effective program you must
make strategic moves throughout the process to make interactions
between the mentor and mentee easy.144 First and foremost, the
mentor must remove any preconceived notions that he or she may
have about the area in which he or she is going to be mentoring.
Secondly, the mentor should greet the mentee with open arms without passing judgments about his or her appearance or stature.
This alone has the potential to remove any preexisting barriers.
Thirdly, the mentor should start the mentoring process by dealing
with things relevant to the mentee, e.g. family, friends, living environment, etc. Starting with a light subject matter creates an open
relationship where the mentee feels free to talk; creating a level of
trust. Fourthly, after a trusting relationship has been built, the mentor can then begin to move to topics that are more personal and difficult for the mentee to discuss, e.g. his or her involvement in crime,
gangs, causes of delinquency, or personal family issues. Getting to
the causes of juvenile delinquency is not always an easy task, especially if you want a child to discuss his or her personal circumstances. Lastly, after learning what causes the mentee to engage in
delinquent behavior, the mentor must find ways to combat delinquent behavior. This will require the mentor to come up with innovative ideas. The challenge at this juncture is helping the mentee to
see that they are no different than anyone else when it comes to
overcoming adversity. The mentor must reinforce the message that
if he or she overcame adversity, so can the mentee.
Following this type of strategic plan may be what made
JUMP so successful. Sometimes it is the small things in life that
can change the direction a person’s life is taking, and in the case of
the JUMP program, it is simply having a one-on-one mentoring session with someone who can connect with their mentee.145 Each of
the mentors made a difference in the lives of their mentees because
they followed the principle of Sun Tzu: “The general who wins a
battle makes many calculations before the battle is fought.”146
Conversely, “the general who loses a battle makes but a few calculations beforehand.”147 This is an important principle to remember
when mentoring because if you make the wrong decision to do
and/or say something at the wrong time due to your failure to make
the necessary calculations, you have the potential of ruining your
chances of reaching that particular child.148 It behooves mentors
and others alike to think before acting; the consequences for not
doing so could be severe.
The Five Constant Factors
To understand the importance of making strategic decisions when implementing a new program to address a particular
problem, one should look to Sun Tzu’s five constant factors.149
Sun Tzu uses these five factors to give the strategist an “account
[of] the natural structure within which a conflict takes place, the
considerations of time, place, terrain, and resources, as well as the
characteristics of the competing leaders and their forces.”150
The five factors are moral law, heaven, earth, the commander, and
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method and discipline.151
The Application of the Five Constant Factors
The first factor is the moral law: “the degree to which a
people, relevant group, or even individuals support their leader’s
decisions, goals and efforts.”152 This particular factor is important
when addressing juvenile delinquency because the idea that there is
an increase in violent delinquent children comes from the media,
political leaders, and public figures. These are the leaders influencing and rallying for change in the juvenile justice system.153 This
notion of an increase in juveniles committing criminal acts has been
accepted by many legislatures and community activists.
Today our national juvenile system is divided into states which
“have chosen to reform juvenile justice by 1) making available a
wide spectrum of community based residential and nonresidential
programs for most of their committed youth and 2) reserving small
secure facilities for the violent few”, on the one hand, and “other
states [that] have largely eschewed treatment and rehabilitation in
favor of more get-tough policies across the board.”154
Therefore, one can assume that if the media continues to exploit the
issue of the explosion of the juvenile crime rate, moral support for
this get-tough initiative will continue to gain momentum.
The second and third factors Sun Tzu described, heaven
and earth, work simultaneously in this context with implementing
programs. Heaven deals with the intangible framework in which a
strategist must operate,155 whereas earth deals with the tangible
framework to which the strategist must adapt.156 Understanding
these two factors requires a program organizer to revert back to my
initial inference that in order to rectify a problem, one must accept
the fact that there is a problem, get to the root of it, find a reasonable and efficient mechanism to deal with the problem, and attack
the problem from the outset. Under a heaven analysis, program
organizers have to realize that regardless of the type of juvenile
delinquency program they are trying to implement, there will
always be intangible factors that supersede their control and what
they are trying to accomplish, such as the norms, values, and culture
of the community.157 The community will not change or stop what
it is doing because a program organizer wants to change the direction that juveniles are taking in its community. Furthermore, the
likelihood of changing the people of a community is even more difficult from an earth aspect because people only change when they
want to change, regardless of whether the programs one tries to
implement will save lives.158
The last two factors, the commander and the method and
discipline, also work simultaneously together but this time, through
an individual. A commander in the context of juvenile delinquency
is the person who has the enthusiasm, drive, wisdom, and strength
to implement effective programs for delinquent juveniles.159 This
same person would also be the individual who would instruct others as to what their role would be to ensure smooth running of the
initiative, which is considered the method and the discipline.160
Conclusion
Changing the face of the juvenile justice system through
harsher punishment is not the answer if the goal is lower recidivism
rates and fewer serious and repeat juvenile offenders. To accomplish this, people’s mentality of juveniles must turn back to rehabilitation and away from punishment. Punishing a juvenile for the
criminal act he or she has committed is not wrong, but it is wrong
to send a child to the adult system because “the system” has failed
to offer programs that treat the offender’s needs.161 Sometimes it
is not always the child that needs changing; sometimes it is the sys-
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tem that is governing the child that needs to be changed. This article offers numerous programs that can be implemented across the
United States to treat the individual needs of juveniles. Hopefully,
instead of sending juveniles to adult prisons, they will be sent to
programs that work, and all will keep in mind that harsher treatment
does not always mean better outcomes.
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